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Abstract 
This paper extends the multi-period agri-environmental contract model of Fraser (2004) 
so that it contains a more realistic specification of the inter-temporal penalties for non-
compliance, and therefore of the inter-temporal moral hazard problem in agri-
environmental policy design.  On this basis it is shown that a farmer will have an 
unambiguous preference for cheating early over cheating late in the contract period based 
on differences in the expected cost of compliance.  It is then shown how the principal can 
make use of this unambiguous preference to target monitoring resources intertemporally, 
and in so doing, to encourage full contract duration compliance. 
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Introduction 
In the last decade or so researchers have begun investigating the moral hazard problem in 
relation to agri-environmental policy.  In such policies farmers voluntarily participate in 
the production of environmental goods and services in return for payment.  However, 
farmers are also required to incur costs in providing these goods and services.  Therefore, 
such farmers have an incentive not to comply with these requirements, depending both on 
their likelihood of avoiding detection, and on the penalties for non-compliance if caught 
cheating.  It follows that the policy design problem is to manage farmer behaviour to 
minimise the negative impact of the moral hazard problem on the policy’s cost-
effectiveness (see Choe and Fraser, 1999; Ozanne, Hogan and Colman, 2001; Fraser, 
2002).  However, virtually all these studies, including the most recent, have framed the 
policy design problem within an atemporal context, choosing instead to investigate a 
range of circumstantial complications such as heterogeneity among farmers and the 
relative effectiveness of alternative policy mechanisms (see Hart and Latacz-Lohmann, 
2005; Ozanne and White, 2007).  This static framing of the policy design problem, while 
perhaps justifiable in terms of keeping the theoretical specification of the problem 
manageable, is nevertheless in clear contrast to the design of actual agri-environmental 
policies, which are typically based on a multi-year contract duration.  For example, 
Natural England (2010) in relation to the Higher Level Stewardship Scheme specifies a 
ten-year contract period.  
 
One exception to these static studies of the moral hazard problem in agri-environmental 
policy design is Fraser (2004), which uses a multi-period framework to investigate the 
potential benefits of “targeting” the use of monitoring resources to enforce compliance.  
In Fraser’s multi-period model this “targeting” involves separating farmers into two 




However, while Fraser’s multi-period model enables farmer behaviour to be managed 
over time to improve policy cost-effectiveness, Fraser’s specification of the farmer’s 
dynamic decision problem is very simple.  In particular, a farmer is specified to see the 
penalties for non-compliance as independent of the time period within which non- 
compliance is detected.  Moreover, this static specification of penalties is in contrast to 
actual agri-environmental policies where there is typically a clear inter-temporal 
                                                           
1 See Heyes (2000) for a review of other regulation literature which analyses the concept of “targeting”. 
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dimension to the penalties for non-compliance.  For example, in relation to Natural 
England’s Higher Level Stewardship Scheme (HLS), it is stated that penalties may 
involve the withholding of “part or all of any future payments due under your agreement” 
as well as the recovery of (with “interest charged”) “part or all of the payments already 
made to you under the agreement” (Natural England, 2010, p11). 
 
It should be recognised that each of the above components of the HLS policy’s penalty 
system is designed to mitigate different aspects of the inter-temporal moral hazard 
problem.  Specifically, by threatening farmers with the withholding of future payments if 
caught not complying, Natural England is discouraging such farmers from cheating early 
in the contract period for fear of losing all future benefits of participation.  And by 
threatening farmers with the recovery (with “interest charged”) of past payments if caught 
not complying, Natural England is discouraging such farmers from cheating late in the 
contract period for fear of having to repay all past benefits of participation. 
 
As a consequence, the aim of this paper is to extend the multi-period model of Fraser 
(2004) so that it contains a more realistic specification of inter-temporal penalties, and 
therefore of the inter-temporal moral hazard problem.  In so doing, it will investigate both 
the relative incentives for farmers to cheat early and/or late in their contract period, and 
the potential for the principal to use the targeting of monitoring resources to further 
mitigate the inter-temporal moral hazard problem.
2 
 
The structure of the payer is as follows.  Section 2 first sets out the extension of the multi-
period model of Fraser (2004) so that it contains an inter-temporal specification of the 
penalties for non-compliance.  It then examines the implications of this specification for a 
farmer’s incentives to cheat early and/or late in the contract period.  In particular, it is 
shown that a farmer will have an unambiguous preference for cheating early over 
cheating late, although cheating all the time, or none of the time, may be superior 
alternatives to occasional cheating.  Next Section 3 provides a numerical analysis of the 
model of Section 2.  This numerical analysis enables both an evaluation of the role of the 
main parameter values of the model in determining farmer behaviour, and an evaluation 
of the potential for the targeting of monitoring resources to further mitigate the inter-
                                                           
2 Literature in this context seems very thin.  One exception is Rice and Sen (2008) which examines the 
inter-temporal moral hazard problem in relation to basketball players in the WBA. 
  3   
temporal moral hazard problem.  The paper ends with a brief Conclusion which 
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Section 2:  The Model 
2.1  Extending the Model of Fraser (2004) 
 
The model of Fraser (2004) uses a two-period decision context to capture the “early” and 
“late” aspects of contract duration for a risk averse farmer.  In this context the farmer 
considers the present value of expected utility from four alternatives: 
 
(i)  complying in both periods 
(ii) complying in the first period, but not the second 
(iii) complying in the second period, but not the first 
(iv)   not complying in both periods. 
 
The farmer’s income ( ) in each period of complying is given by:  i I
     =  B + x - y  (1)  i I
where:    
     =  income in period i (i=1,2)  i I
   B =  income independent of participation 
   x =  payment  for  participating 
   y  =   cost of complying 
   x  >  y 
Note that if the farmer chooses not to comply, and is not caught, then: 
     =  B + x   (2)  i I
However, if the farmer chooses not to comply, and is caught, then a penalty is incurred. 
 
In Fraser (2004) this penalty was specified simply as a proportion of the payment for 
participating in that period (i.e. x), and was therefore independent of the contract 
duration.
3  In what follows this feature of the model of Fraser (2004) is modified to 
reflect the type of inter-temporal penalty system discussed previously.  Specifically, a 
farmer caught cheating in period 1 is penalised not just by the recovery of the payment for  
                                                           
3 Note, however that with the introduction of targeting in Fraser (2004) a farmer caught cheating in period 1 
would also experience an increase in the probability of being monitored in period 2. 
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participation in that period (i.e. x), but also by the withdrawal of future benefits through 
exclusion from participation in period 2.  Note as outlined previously that this latter 
feature of the penalty system is designed to discourage cheating early in the contract 
period.  In addition, a farmer caught cheating in period 2 is penalised not just by the 
recovery of the payment for participation in that period (i.e. x), but also by the recovery, 
with interest, of the payment for participation in period 1 (i.e.  x (1 + r); where r =  the 
rate of interest).  Note once again that this latter feature of the penalty system is designed 
to discourage cheating late in the contract period. 
 
Inserting this penalty system into the model of Fraser (2004) means that the present value 
of the expected utility (E(U)) from the four alternative farmer behaviours is given by: 
 
   ) 1 /( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 r y x B U y x B U I U TIT + − + + − + =   (3) 
 
   ) 1 /( ))) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( 2 r r x B U p x B pU y x B U I EU TIC + + − − + + + − + =    (4) 
  
   ) 1 /( )) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 r B U p y x B pU B U p x B pU I EU CIT + − + − + + − + + =    (5) 
 
   ))) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) ( ( ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 r x B U p x B pU p B U p x B pU I EU CIC + − − + + + − + + =  (6) 
        ) 1 /( )) ( ) 1 ( r B U p + − +  
Where: 
  p                   =  probability of not being monitored in each period. 
        =   present value of utility of income from complying in both periods.  ) ( 2 TIT I U
     =  present value of expected utility of income from complying in 
period 1, but not in period 2. 
) ( 2 TIC I EU
     =  present value of expected utility of income from not complying in 
period 1, but complying in period 2. 
) ( 2 CIT I EU
     =  present value of expected utility of income from not complying in 
both periods. 
) ( 2 CIC I EU
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Note that in equations (3) – (6) it has been assumed that the probability of not being 
monitored is the same in both periods.  This assumption will be relaxed subsequently in 
the context of considering the potential benefits of the inter-temporal targeting of 
participants.  Note also that the rate of discount of future income has been assumed equal 
to the rate of interest charged on recovered payments for participation within the penalty 
system.   
 
An examination of equations (3) and (6) reveals that the key policy parameters in 
determining the relative size of utility from always complying with expected utility from 
always not complying are: 
 
(i)  p – the probability of not being monitored 
(ii)  (x-y) – the relative size of benefits and costs of complying. 
 
For example, if p = 0, then with x > y: 
 
  
) 1 /( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 r y x B U y x B U I U TIT + − + + − + =
  (7) 
             ) ( ) 1 /( ) ( ) ( 2 CIC I EU r B U B U = + + >  
 
More generally, if p is relatively low and (x-y) is relatively high, then it is expected that: 
 
               (8)  ) ( ) ( 2 2 CIC TIT I EU I U >
 
and so the farmer would comply in both periods.  While if p is relatively high and (x-y) is 
relatively low, then it is expected that: 
 
             ) ( ) ( 2 2 CIC TIT I EU I U <   (9)  
 
and so the farmer would not comply in both periods. 
 
However, further evaluation of the relative size of equations (3) – (6), and in particular 
the size of equations (4) and (5) relative to equations (3) and (6) is analytically ambiguous 
and numerically will also depend on the values of the key policy parameters p and (x-y).  
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Therefore an assessment of the likelihood of a farmer complying occasionally rather than 
complying or not complying throughout the contract period is deferred until the numerical 
analysis of the next Section. 
 
2.2  Cheating Early or Late? 
 
Despite the analytical ambiguity of the size of equations (4) and (5) relative to equations 
(3) and (6), it is nevertheless possible to examine further the relative incentives to comply 
early or late in the contract period.  For a risk averse farmer this can be done by 
considering both the expected income and the variance of income from behavioural 
alternatives (ii) and (iii) (i.e. either cheating late or cheating early).  In particular: 
 




   ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 r B p r y x B p B p x B p I E CIT + − + + − + + − + + =   (11) 
 
Moreover, equations (10) and (11) can be rearranged and simplified to give: 
 
   y r px r B B I E TIC − + + + + + = )) 1 /( 1 1 ( ) 1 /( ) ( 2   (12) 
 
   ) 1 /( )) 1 /( 1 1 ( ) 1 /( ) ( 2 r py r px r B B I E CIT + − + + + + + =   (13) 
 
It follows from a comparison of equations (12) and (13) that: 
 
               (14)  ) ( ) ( 2 2 TIC CIT I E I E >
 
and so it is unambiguously the case that the present value of expected income from 
cheating early exceeds that of cheating late.  Note, however, that this difference arises not 
from a difference in the expected benefit of cheating (i.e.  )) 1 /( 1 1 ( r px + + but rather from 
a difference in the expected costs of complying (i.e.  ) ) 1 y r /( py < + . 
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Next consider the variance of the present value of income from cheating late compared 
with cheating early.  In particular
4: 
 
     (15) 
2 2
2 ))) 1 /( 1 1 ( )( 1 ( ))) 1 /( 1 1 ( ) 1 /( ( ) ( r px p r px r x x p I Var TIC + + − − + + + − + + =
 
while: 
     (16) 
2
2 )) 1 /( )) 1 /( 1 1 ( ) 1 /( ) 1 /( ( ) ( r py r px r y r x x p I Var CIT + + + + − + − + + =
          +  
2 )) 1 /( )) 1 /( 1 1 ( )( 1 ( r py r px p + + + + − −
 
Moreover, equations (15) and (16) can be rearranged and simplified to give: 
 
     (17) 
2
2 ))) 1 /( 1 1 ( )( 1 ( ) ( r x p p I Var TIC + + − =
 
     (18) 
2
2 )) 1 /( )) 1 /( 1 1 ( )( 1 ( ) ( r y r x p p I Var CIT + − + + − =
 
It follows from a comparison of equations (17) and (18) that: 
 
             ) ( ) ( 2 2 TIC CIT I Var I Var <   (19) 
 
and so it is unambiguously the case that the variance of the present value of income from 
cheating early is less than that of cheating late. 
 
Therefore, combining equations (14) and (19) shows that a risk averse farmer will always 
prefer the alternative of cheating early to that of cheating late in the contract period 
because it features both a higher present value of expected income and a lower variance 
of the present value of income.  Moreover, the basis of this preference stems not from a 
difference in the expected benefits of cheating, but rather from a difference in the 
expected costs of complying. 
 
Finally in this section, note that because of this unambiguous preference for cheating 
early compared to cheating late, the potential arises for the principal to consider targeting 
monitoring resources away from those farmers who are in the late phase of their contract 
                                                           
4 Recall that   
2 )) ( ( ) ( x E x E x Var − =
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period and towards those farmers who are in the early phase of their contract period.  In 
so doing, the principal may be able to discourage early cheating without incentivising late 
cheating.  This inter-temporal aspect of targeting is explored further in the numerical 
analysis of the next Section. 
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Section 3:  Numerical Analysis 
 
In order to undertake a numerical analysis of the model in Section 2 it is necessary to 
specify both a particular form for the farmer’s utility function, and a set of parameter 
values to act as a Base Case. 
 

















     (20) 
Where: 
 
  R  =  constant coefficient of relative risk aversion 
   =     ). ( ' / ). ( " I U I I U −
 
In addition, the following parameter values are chosen for a Base Case: 
 
B = 12;   x = 10;   y = 7;   R = 0.2, 0.6 
r = 0;     p = 0.75 
  
On this basis the top panel of Table 1 contains details of the Base Case results in terms of 
the present value of expected utility for the four behavioural alternatives. 
 
In this Base Case the probability of not being monitored in each period has been set 
relatively high (i.e. p = 0.75).  As a consequence, based on the analytical results in 
Section 1 it is expected that the farmer will prefer not to comply in both periods compared 
with complying in both periods.  Moreover, the results in Panel 1 confirm this expectation 
for the lower level of risk aversion of the farmer (i.e. R = 0.2).  However, for the higher 
level of risk aversion (i.e. R = 0.6),   the results in Panel 1 show that the farmer would 
prefer complying in both periods to not complying in both periods.  It follows that the 
combination of higher risk aversion and the increased riskiness of utility brought about by 
not complying is sufficient to deter non-compliance for this type of farmer.  In addition, 
                                                           
5 See Pope and Just (1991) for empirical evidence to support this specification. 
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Panel 2 of Table 1 presents results for the case where the probability of not being 
monitored is considerably lower (i.e. p = 0.5 instead of p = 0.75).  The results in this 
Panel show that even for the lower level of risk aversion (i.e. R = 0.2) compliance in both 
periods is preferred to non-compliance in both periods.  Furthermore, unreported 
sensitivity analysis of the cost of compliance (i.e. y) is consistent with the analytical 
findings of Section 1 in that it shows that increases in the value of (x-y) (i.e. the net 
benefit of compliance) also strengthens the preference for compliance in both periods 
over non-compliance in both periods for a broad range of attitudes to risk. 
 
Next consider the alternatives of occasion cheating (i.e. cheating early or late).  It was 
shown in Section 1 that cheating early would be unambiguously be preferred to cheating 
late because of a difference in the expected costs of compliance, and this finding is 
reflected in the numerical results in Panels 1 and 2 of Table 1.  However, in relation to the 
farmer’s preference for cheating early relative to not cheating in either period, or to 
cheating in both periods, the results in Panels 1 and 2 demonstrate that it is possible for 
the farmer to prefer cheating early to the other two alternatives.  In particular, Panel 1 
shows that, although for the more risk averse farmer (i.e. R = 0.6) compliance in both 
periods is preferred to non-compliance in both periods, the most preferred option for the 
farmer is to cheat in the first period but comply in the second (i.e. 15.37  > 14.77 > 
14.28).   Similarly, in Panel 2, although for the less risk averse farmer (i.e. R = 0.2), 
compliance in both periods is preferred to non-compliance in both periods, the most 
preferred option for the farmer is to cheat in the first period but comply in the second (i.e. 
21.99  > 21.82 > 19.87). 
 
Therefore, this numerical analyses has demonstrated that, depending on the probability of 
being monitored, the net benefits of compliance, and the risk aversion of the farmer, the 
balance of risk and expected return for the option of cheating occasionally may be such 
that this option is preferred both to the lower risk option of always complying and to the 
higher risk option of always cheating.
6  Nevertheless, this preference for occasional 
cheating will always be characterised by cheating early rather than late in the contract 
period. 
 
                                                           
6 Note that for Panel 1 (i.e. p=0.75), if R=0.4 then E(U(ICIT2)) > E(U(ICIC2)) > U(ITIT2).  That is, cheating 
early may be the most preferred option even when cheating in both periods is preferred to not cheating in 
both periods.  This example supplements those in Table 1 for which E(U(ICIT2)) > U(ITIT2) > E(U(ICIC2)). 
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Finally in this Section return to considering the potential raised earlier for the inter-
temporal targeting of monitoring resources.  In particular, given the unambiguous 
preference for cheating early over cheating late in the contract period, the potential arises 
for the principal to target monitoring resources away from farmers who are in the late 
phase of their contract period and towards those farmers who are in the early phase of 
their contract periods.  This potential is illustrated in Panel 3 of Table 1 which is based on 
the Panel 2 parameter values for p=0.5 and R = 0.2 and considers reallocating monitoring 
resources away from those farmers in period 2 of their contract and towards those farmers 
in period 1 of their contract.  Specifically, this is done by increasing the probability of not 
being monitored for those farmers in period 2 from 0.5 to 0.6, and decreasing the 
probability of not being monitored for those farmers in period 1 from 0.5 to 0.4.  The 
results of this inter-temporal targeting of monitoring resources on the present value of the 
expected utility of each behavioural alternative are presented in the second row of Panel 
3.  These results show that the consequence of this inter-temporal targeting is both to 
increase the expected utility of cheating late, and to decrease the expected utility of 
cheating early, but such that complying in both periods becomes the most preferred 
option.  In other words, by trading off some of the relative disadvantage of the cheating 
late option the principal is able to use the extra monitoring resources to discourage the 
cheating early option to the point where full contract duration compliance is preferred. 
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Conclusion 
 
Most recent contributions to agri-environmental policy design have framed the moral 
hazard problem within an atemporal context.  One exception to this is the study of Fraser 
(2004), which uses a multi-period contract framework to analyse the moral hazard 
problem, but specifies the inter-temporal components of the farmer’s decision problem in 
a very simple way.  In particular this specification fails to incorporate the inter-temporal 
dimension to the penalties for non-compliance which is characteristic of actual agri-
environmental policies, and which are designed to discourage non-compliance both early 
and late in the contract period.  On this basis, this paper extends the multi-period model of 
Fraser (2004) so that it contains a more realistic specification of inter-temporal penalties 
for non-compliance, and therefore of the inter-temporal moral hazard problem. 
 
Section 2 set out the extension of the model of Fraser (2004) and examined the 
implications of this extended specification for a farmer’s incentives to cheat early and/or 
late or not at all in the contract period.  In particular, it was shown not just which 
parameters play a key role in determining these incentives, but also that a farmer will 
have an unambiguous preference for cheating early over cheating late in the contract 
period based on differences in the expected cost of compliance. 
 
Section 3 first provided a numerical evaluation of the role of the main parameter values of 
the model in determining farmer behaviour:  the probability of not being monitored; the 
net benefits of compliance; and the risk aversion of the farmer.  Section 3 then illustrated 
the potential for the principal to target monitoring resources inter-temporally, by 
capitalising on the unambiguous preference demonstrated in Section 2 for cheating early 
over cheating late in the contract period.  In particular, it was shown how the principal 
could reallocate monitoring resources away from farmers late in their contract period and 
towards farmers early in their contract period, and in so doing discourage the cheating 
early option sufficiently for full contract compliance to become the preferred option. 
 
Consequently, it may be concluded that the targeting of monitoring resources away from 
farmers in the late stage and towards farmers in the early stage of their contract period has 
the potential to further mitigate the inter-temporal moral hazard problem. 
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Results of the Numerical Analysis
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Panel 2 (p=0.5) 





























      
 
Panel 3 (R=0.2) 




























    Note a:  B = 12;   x = 10;   y = 7;   r = 0 
 